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• Rapid expansion of market for credit default swaps:
— $600 bil in 1999, $17 trillion in 2006.
• Previous research:
— Use pricing of CDS to measure price of default risk.
• This paper:
— Does CDS trading reduce the ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost of capital?
2Issues to consider:
• What has happened to corporate risk spreads over time?
• What can we learn about corporate bond spreads from CDS rates?
• Does expansion of CDS market have direct implications for the cost of
capital?
• Does the cost of capital matter for investment?
3Trends in corporate bond spreads
• Corporate bond spreads are countercyclical.
• Large increase in dispersion of corporate bond spreads since late 1990’s.
— More ﬁrms appear willing to ﬂoat junk bonds rather than investment
grade securities.
— Why?
• Recent boom-bust cycle — are credit spreads consistent with underlying
default probabilities?
4Corporate Bond Characteristics



















Interest Rates and Investment Redux 8Expected Default Risk













Interest Rates and Investment Redux 12CDS Arbitrage:
• Arbitrage:
Pcds = rB − rf
where
— Pcds = Annualized price of insurance against default
— rB =C o r p o r a t eb o n dy i e l d
— rf =R i s kf r e er a t e .
• Limits to shorting bonds (repo costs) and CTD (cheapest to deliver)
options on CDS imply:
Pcds >Tr u eD e fa u l t Premium > rB − rf
• Blanco et al. argue that arbitrage holds in long-run. Short-run de-
viations owing to repo and CTD options combined with information
acquistion occurs in CDS market rather than cash bond market.
5CDS Pricing I:
• Berndt et al. estimate:
Pcds = αEDF + Σγidt
where EDF measures KMV expected default probability.
then
ˆ α =1 6 /10









• Risk neutral default probability implies that the market price of risk
rises by $2 for every $1 increase in expected discounted loss!
• There is a large multiplicative risk premium on credit default
• Models with credit frictions may be able to explain this (Levin, Na-
talucci, Zakrajsek).
7CDS Pricing II
• Log speciﬁcation provides better ﬁt:
lnPcds = αo +0 .75lnEDF + Σγidt,R 2 =0 .75
• Also true if we estimate this on corporate bond spreads using annual
data.
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• Most of recent run-up and collapse of corporate bond spreads is due to
unexplained “aggregate “default-risk factors”
— Expected default probability only explains a fraction of time-series
variation in bond spreads.
• This ﬁnding is also apparent in Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek
— Unexplained time variation in the cost of monitoring.
• Bottom line:
— Price of credit risk implies large and time-varying default risk pre-
mia.
— Why?
9Does CDS trading have a direct inﬂuence on cost of capital?
• Increased information:
— CDS market allows investors to go long and short in corporate risk.
— Cash bond market diﬃcult to short. Buy and hold behavior also
limit investor ability to go long.
• Increased supply:
— Allows lender (bank) to hedge credit risk associated with any given
borrower.
— Borrower may be willing to lend more and/or at a lower price.
10Does contractual interest rate fall when lender can insure
credit risk?
• Standard debt contract:
— Borrow B = K − N.
— Project pays ωRKK.
— If ω>¯ ω borrower pays ¯ ωRkK




• Default insurance eﬀectively reduces costs in default state. Equivalent
to a reduction in the cost of monitoring.
— When monitoring costs fall, borrower is monitored more frequently
¯ ω rises.
— Leverage (K/B) will also increase.
• Eﬀect of insurance on contractual interest rate R∗ is ambiguous.
• Also, insurance costs should be included in contractual rate since they
are paid in non-monitored states of world.
11Does availability of insurance necessarily reduce eﬀective cost
of capital for the borrower?
• Absent insurance, lender self insures through loan portfolio.
• If lender insures one borrower, this may actually increase loan portfolio
risk.
• If lender can insure all borrowers, this would reduce cost of capital for
loan portfolio but we would not see a direct eﬀect on a speciﬁc ﬁrm.
12Comments on empirical work I:
• Sample selection is an issue — why do some ﬁrms have traded CDS?
• Matched sample appears substantially diﬀerent from traded sample:
— 50% smaller.
— Twice as likely to have lowest credit rating.
— Twice as likely to have a secured loan.
13Comments on empiricalwork II:
• Reduced form regression has endogenous variables on right hand side:
R∗ − Rf = αCDS + γQ+ ε
— Firms have high Q because they are low quality (Himmelberg, Hub-
bard and Love).
— Improvement in ﬁnancial contract is priced in Q, in equilibrium it
should fall as CDS trading occurs — α should be zero?
• Better way to do this:
R∗ − Rf = αCDS + γEDF + ε
Holding expected default probability ﬁxed, what is eﬀect of CDS trad-
ing on bond or loan spread?
14Summary:
• Impressive data eﬀorts.
• Simple contracting framework would be useful to obtain clearer empir-
ical predictions.
— Financial innovation may lead to higher leverage rather than reduc-
tion in contractual interest rate.
• More generally
— Credit default swaps can inform us about movements in price of
default risk.
— Macroeconomists need to understand what drives aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions in the default risk premium and whether they have real eﬀects.
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